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Abstract
We study the extremely high and low residual spenders in individual health insurance markets in three countries. A high (low) 
residual spender is someone for whom the residual—spending less payment (from premiums and risk adjustment)—is high 
(low), indicating that the person is highly underpaid (overpaid). We begin with descriptive analysis of the top and bottom 
1% and 0.1% of residuals building to address the question of the degree of persistence in membership at the extremes. Com-
mon findings emerge among the countries. First, the diseases found among those with the highest residual spending are also 
disproportionately found among those with the lowest residual spending. Second, those at the top of the residual spending 
distribution (where spending exceeds payments the most) account for a massively high share of the unexplained variance 
in the predictions from the risk adjustment model. Third, in terms of persistence, we find that membership in the extremes 
of the residual spending distribution is highly persistent, raising concerns about selection-related incentives targeting these 
individuals. As our results show, the one-in-a-thousand people (on both sides of the residual distribution) play an outsized 
role in creating adverse incentives associated with health plan payment systems. In response to the observed importance of 
the extremes of the residual spending distribution, we propose an innovative combination of risk-pooling and reinsurance 
targeting the predictively undercompensated group. In all three countries, this form of risk sharing substantially improves 
the overall fit of payments to spending. Perhaps surprisingly, by reducing the burden on diagnostic indicators to predict high 
payments, our proposed risk sharing policy reduces the gap between payments and spending not only for the most under-
compensated individuals but also for the most overcompensated people.
Keywords Health insurance · Risk selection · Risk adjustment · Risk sharing
JEL Classification I11 · I13
Introduction
Health care spending is non-negative and right skewed 
with the top 10% and even more so the top 1% of spend-
ers accounting for a disproportionate share of all spend-
ing. The National Institute for Health Care Management 
(NICHM) found, for example, using data from the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey for 2014 that the top 5% of spend-
ers accounted for half of all spending, and the top 1% alone 
accounted for more than 20% of all spending.1 Bakx et al. 
[1] uncovered a similar pattern in The Netherlands where the 
top 1% of spenders accounted for one-quarter of all spend-
ing. For private health insurance in Germany, Karlsson et al. 
[10] show that 53% of all medical spending is due to the top 
10% of all spenders.
Research focus on the high spenders is motivated not only 
by concern about cost, but also by a concern for the efficient 
functioning of individual health insurance markets organized 
around principles of choice and competition. In these mar-
ket-based policies, competing plans receive a risk-adjusted 
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payment for each enrollee, as is done in Germany, The Neth-
erlands, Switzerland, the Marketplaces in the U.S., and else-
where.2 Risk-adjusted payments fall far short for some indi-
viduals with very high spending, and it is this shortfall, not 
the level of spending per se, that creates incentive problems 
in these markets. Recently, research has sharpened the focus 
to what is termed high “residual spending”, where residual 
spending is the shortfall, spending less payment.3 Focus on 
residual spending also directs attention to the opposite case, 
when payments exceed spending.4 Very high profits at the 
individual level as well as very high losses can disturb the 
efficient functioning of health insurance markets, especially 
when these profits and losses are persistent, pointing out the 
importance to understand the population on both sides of the 
residual spending distribution.
Following recent papers, we focus on the extremely high 
and low residual spenders, conducting analyses on not just 
the top and bottom 1% of residuals, but also on the top and 
bottom 0.1%. Our main interest is in the question of whether 
membership in the extremes persists year-to-year. If so, 
strong adverse selection incentives are created by the pre-
dictable losers and predictable winners in an insured popula-
tion which may lead insurers to selectively target profitable 
people while underserving the unprofitable ones (typically 
those with high medical needs). As our results show, in all 
three countries, these one-in-a-thousand people (on both 
sides of the residual distribution) play an outsized role in 
creating adverse incentives associated with health plan pay-
ment systems.
To build up to the question of persistence, we conduct 
descriptive analyses of the extremes of the residual-spending 
distribution. In spite of significant differences in health care 
systems and the risk adjustment algorithms employed in the 
three countries, some common findings emerge. First, the 
diseases found among those with the highest residual spend-
ing are also disproportionately found among those with the 
lowest residual spending. In other words, some of the health 
conditions that put individuals in the highly undercompen-
sated category are also responsible for putting them in the 
highly overcompensated category. For example, in the U.S. 
Marketplaces, diabetes is the single most common illness 
among the most undercompensated and the most overcom-
pensated. Second, in all three countries, those at the top of 
the residual spending distribution (where spending exceeds 
payments the most) account for a massively high share of 
the unexplained variance in the predictions from the risk 
adjustment model. This finding indicates that some form 
of reinsurance can have a substantial impact on payment 
system performance.
Our focus on persistence of high and low residual spend-
ing is distinct from much of the prior literature which has 
focused on high spenders and persistence of high spending, 
not residuals. For example, Hirth et al. [8] use 2003–2008 
MarketScan employer claims data and find that 43.4% of 
those in the top 10% of health care spending in 2003 were 
in the top decile 1 year later. Some persistence remains even 
after 5 years. Of those in the top 10% in 2003, 34.4% were in 
the top decile 5 years later. Other studies in the U.S. also find 
persistence in spending.5 Karlsson et al. [10] for Germany 
and Bakx et al. [1] for the Netherlands characterize per-
sistence in spending in privately insured populations.6 Van 
Veen [22] is one of the few studies with a focus on residual 
spending. Using data from the Netherlands, she finds that 
people in the top of the residual spending distribution in 
the current year have a relatively high probability of being 
3 Schillo et  al. [19], Farid and McGuire [6], Kauer et  al. [11], Van 
Veen [22]. “Residuals” have, in fact, been the focus of empirical risk 
adjustment research all along. An R2 of a risk adjustment regression 
is based on residuals, as are measures of over- and undercompensa-
tion and predictive ratios at a group level. An over/undercompensa-
tion measure is, in a system in which payment is fully determined 
by risk adjustment, simply the average value of the residuals for the 
group in question.
4 In any break-even payment system, residual payments must sum to 
zero. Furthermore, risk-adjusted payments based on an OLS/WLS 
regression with disease indicators implies that residuals sum to zero 
conditional on a disease indicator. This property of OLS/WLS-based 
payment models guides some of our interpretation below.
5 Monheit [18] found that the top 1% of spenders account for 27% of 
all expenditure, and between 1996 and 1997, of the top 5% of spend-
ers 30% stay within that group in the next year. Similarly, Figueroa 
et  al. [7] use a 20% sample of Medicare beneficiaries from 2012 to 
2014 and find that 28.1% of individuals are in the top 10% of spend-
ing for three consecutive years. Using data from the Medical Expend-
iture Panel Study (MEPS) Cohen and Yu [2] observe 40% of those in 
the top decile of spending in 2009 remain in the top decile in 2010. 
For Medicaid/Chip insured people, persistence was shown to be even 
higher: DeLia [3] calculated that of the top 1% of spenders in 2011, 
31% remained there 3  years later and 27% were among the top 1% 
spenders in each of the years from 2012 to 2014. If deceased and dis-
enrolled persons were excluded from the analyses, the corresponding 
percentage would be 47.3%.
6 Karlsson et al. [10] find that 56.19% of the insured in the top quin-
tile of spending in 2010 are also in the top spending quintile in 2011. 
Over the whole study period from 2005 to 2011, 55.02% remain 
within the top spending quintile. Bakx et al. [1] were able to show for 
the entire Dutch population that 60% (56%) of individuals in the top 
quintile of the spending distribution in 1 year are also in the top quin-
tile of spending after 1 (2) year.
2 Belgium, Colombia, Israel, and Medicare Advantage (the private 
option for Medicare beneficiaries in the U.S.) among other countries 
and sectors, share some similar features. McGuire and Van Kleef [16] 
contain descriptions of the individual health plan markets structured 
as regulated competition in 14 countries and sectors. In the three mar-
kets studied here, payments to insurers consist of two components: a 
compensation from the risk adjustment system and a premium. For 
reasons of simplicity, however, this paper integrates the two compo-
nents by assuming that the payment that an insurer receives for indi-
vidual i equals i’s predicted spending from the risk adjustment model. 
For all three markets, this payment will closely approximate the sum 
of i’s premium and compensation from the risk-adjusted system.
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in that same position next year. With a focus on residual 
spending, however, it is not only the positive extreme (i.e., 
underpayments) of the distribution that is relevant, but also 
the negative extreme (i.e., overpayments). As we will show, 
overpayments are sometimes very large in absolute value. In 
sum, we go beyond existing research to conduct comparative 
analyses with recent data from three prominent social health 
insurance markets to characterize patterns of residual spend-
ing on both extremes of the distribution.
After establishing the empirical importance and per-
sistence of extremely high and low residual spending, we 
study how risk sharing can help to better compensate insur-
ers for people with extremely high and persistent positive 
residual spending. Building on prior research from all three 
countries,7 we propose a new targeted form of risk sharing: 
residual-based reinsurance for persons with high residual 
spending in a prior period, a policy that, in effect, combines 
elements of high-cost risk-pooling and reinsurance. Results 
for the three countries are very similar. Targeted reinsur-
ance reduces underpayments for these high-risk groups 
while touching a small share of overall spending and a very 
small share of the population, alleviating potential concerns 
with loss of plan incentives to control costs. And notably, 
although our targeted reinsurance is directed to reducing 
underpayment for high-cost cases, in all three countries, 
targeting also reduces overpayments for those for whom 
payments exceed costs the most. With targeted reinsurance 
in place, payment weights on very expensive illnesses are 
reduced, lowering overpayments for those with these seri-
ous illnesses. Similarity of the results for the three countries 
lends support to the generalizability of our findings.
“Health plan payment in Germany, The Netherlands and 
the U.S. marketplaces” describes the health plan payment 
systems and the data from the three countries. “Data and 
empirical methods” describes the methods and “Results” 
presents the results for several empirical analyses, begin-
ning with estimation of risk-adjusted payment models faith-
ful to actual practice in each country. These payment models 
form the basis for our analyses of residual spending and the 
simulation of our targeted risk sharing policy. “Discussion” 
concludes with a discussion of the findings from our empiri-
cal work and the payment system simulations.
Health plan payment in Germany, The 
Netherlands and the U.S. marketplaces
Individual health insurance markets in Germany, The Neth-
erlands and Marketplaces in the U.S. are organized around 
principles of regulated (or managed) competition, as first 
proposed by Enthoven [5]. Regulated competition puts 
health plans in competition for enrollees with the goal of 
generating incentives for cost containment and efficient plan 
design.8 In policies that differ country-by-country, regulators 
promote competition by allowing health plans limited discre-
tion about plan design (e.g., in terms of provider network and 
cost-sharing options). At the same time, the regulators use 
demand- and supply-side pricing policies to guarantee public 
objectives such as individual affordability and accessibility 
of health plans. In all three countries, enrollee premiums do 
not differ according to the health status of individuals while 
some form of risk adjustment of plan payment is done cen-
trally to transfer funds to plans enrolling costlier individu-
als. Risk adjustment is designed to ensure plan viability, but 
more importantly, to counter plan incentives to selectively 
attract the healthy and deter the sick from joining the plan.
Germany
The public health insurance system in Germany is the larg-
est individual health insurance market in the world, both 
in terms of the number of lives covered and in terms of the 
total plan payments [16, 23]. In 1996, free choice of sickness 
funds was introduced for all members of the social health 
insurance system. Two years prior, in 1994, risk adjustment 
was established to provide equal opportunities for sickness 
funds with diverging risk profiles of their insured. In 2009, 
the formerly mostly demographic risk adjustment system 
became morbidity based. Since then the payments to the 
sickness funds are calculated by an individual-level least 
squares regression weighted by the fraction of the year the 
individual is enrolled in the social health insurance system. 
Risk adjustors (see Table 1) are included in the form of 
dummy variables. The model is prospective: expenditures 
from 1 year are explained by demographic characteris-
tics from the same year but the morbidity characteristics 
7 Van Barneveld et  al. [20], Schillo et  al. [19] and McGuire et  al. 
[17].
8 By ‘health plan competition’, we mean competition among health 
insurers who offer one or multiple health plans. A ‘health plan’ refers 
to a health insurance product. All consumers who have the same 
‘health plan’ have an identical contract with the same insurer con-
cerning benefits coverage, cost-sharing, quality, services, etc. Since 
objectives and strategies of insurers can differ across health plans 
(primarily in the U.S. and The Netherlands), this paper will speak of 
health plans instead of insurers as decision makers.
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are taken from the previous year.9 From 2002 until 2009, 
risk adjustment was complemented by reinsurance from a 
high-expenditure pool through which sickness funds were 
reimbursed 60% of spending above a certain threshold. With 
the introduction of the morbidity-based risk adjustment, the 
high-expenditure pool was abolished. Starting in 2021, a 
high-spending pool will be reintroduced into the German 
risk adjustment system, compensating for 80% of individual-
level spending above a threshold of 100,000 Euros.
The Netherlands
Since 2006, The Netherlands have had a national health 
insurance system based on principles of regulated compe-
tition. Consumers may switch insurance plans every year 
and insurers have several tools to promote efficiency such 
as selective contracting of healthcare providers, utilization 
management and flexibility regarding provider payment 
design [21]. The Dutch risk adjustment system has been 
improved over time. In the early years, the risk adjustment 
system was supplemented with reinsurance to mitigate 
selection incentives remaining after risk adjustment and to 
mitigate plans’ business risk due to financial uncertainties 
surrounding specific healthcare system reforms. As risk 
adjustment was improved and the health insurance market 
stabilized, reinsurance thresholds were increased; in 2014, 
reinsurance was abolished altogether.10 For our analyses 
we use the Dutch risk adjustment system from 2018, which 
consisted of three different models, one for each of the fol-
lowing categories: somatic care, mental health care, and 
out-of-pocket payments due to the mandatory deductible 
of 385 Euros per adult per year [21]. For simplicity, our 
analyses will be based on the model for somatic care only. 
This model accounts for about 85% of total spending and 
includes a broad set of risk adjustors based on several types 
of information, which are described in Table 1. Risk adjus-
tors take the form of dummy variables indicating whether 
an individual is a member of a class or not. Risk adjustor 
coefficients for the model of 2018 were derived by an indi-
vidual-level weighted least squares regression of annualized 
expenditures in 2015 on demographic variables from year 
2015 and the disease indicators listed in Table 1 from 2014 
or before. Like Germany, the Dutch model is, therefore, also 
prospective, using morbidity data from a prior period to pre-
dict spending in the current period. Prior to estimation of 
the risk adjustment model 2018, some modifications were 
applied to make the available data from 2015 representative 
for 2018 (e.g., including modifications for changes in the 
benefits package).11
U.S. Marketplaces
The U.S. Marketplaces, created as part of the Affordable 
Care Act (2010) and popularly known as “Obamacare”, 
began enrolling individuals and families in 2014 [14, 15]. 
These markets, organized at the state level, are intended to 
provide affordable health insurance for those without insur-
ance through their employers or through other public pro-
grams. The law included a number of reforms which shifted 
the individual health insurance market toward a version of 
regulated competition, including income-related subsidies, 
(partial) community rating of premiums, mandated cover-
age of a basket of “essential health benefits,” and guaran-
teed issue and renewal provisions prohibiting plans from 
rejecting applicants based on their health status. As of 2019, 
about 11.4 million Americans are enrolled in a Marketplace 
plan, the majority of whom receive some premium subsidy. 
The extent of coverage in Marketplace plans ranges from 
approximately 60% on average for “bronze” plans to 90% for 
“platinum” plans. The most popular metal level is “silver” 
with coverage at 70%.
The Marketplace risk adjustment model assigns risk 
scores to enrollees based on their demographics and 
observed diagnoses during the current plan year (i.e., cal-
endar year), in contrast to the programs in Germany and 
The Netherlands which use morbidity data from the pre-
vious year. The Marketplace model is said to be “concur-
rent” as opposed to “prospective” in the other two coun-
tries. Risk scores are calculated using a model developed 
by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
the HHS Hierarchical Condition Categories (HHS-HCC) 
model. See Table 1. The HHS-HCC model has undergone 
several iterations since its inception in 2014, with HHS-HCC 
V0519 (2019), a slight modification of V0518 (2018), intro-
duced for 2019.12 The HHS-HCC V0519 model predicts an 
enrollee’s medical spending by mapping diagnoses coded 
on insurance claims into one of 128 HHS-selected HCCs, 
which were drawn from the larger set of HCCs available in 
12 https ://www.cms.gov/CCIIO /Resou rces/Regul ation s-and-Guida 
nce/Downl oads/Updat ed-CY201 8-DIY-instr uctio ns.pdf. V0518 split 
HCC037 (chronic hepatitis) into a 37a and 37b to distinguish types 
of hepatitis and, in a major change, included risk adjustor variables 
based on prescription drug data.
9 The German regression is run on cost per day which is in principle 
equivalent to the annualization procedure used in the Netherlands.
10 As of 2020, some reinsurance will be reintroduced for mental 
healthcare spending.
11 In the regression model, expenditures were annualized and the 
observations weighted by the fraction of the year an individual was 
enrolled in 2015 (which can be smaller than 1.0 due to birth, death, 
migration and other factors). For example, a person with a half-year 
enrollment and 2000 Euro expenditures was given a weight of 0.5 and 
annualized expenditures of 4000 Euro (2000/0.5).
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the diagnostic classification system.13 In a major change, 
V0518 added 12 drug categories (RXC01–RXC12) of which 
ten (RXC01–RXC10) are used directly in the risk adjustment 
model; with the other two used for HCC and RXC interac-
tions only. The V0519 drops the RXC11–12 interactions. 
Drug variables are generated using National Drug Codes 
(NDC) from pharmacy claims with prescription filled dates 
within the benefit year (NDC from medical claims are not 
accepted).14 Beginning with V0418 (2017), CMS introduced 
a variable measuring “months of enrollment” during a con-
tract year to contend with possible underpayment for those 
with partial enrollment periods.15
A “temporary” reinsurance component was part of the 
Marketplace payment system in the first 3 years, but due to a 
continuing concern about high-cost cases, a modest reinsur-
ance function was restored through changes in the formula 
transferring funds among health plans (Jost [9, 13]).16 In this 
paper, we estimate weights using the V05-2019 HHS-HCC 
model for risk adjustment.17
Data and empirical methods
Our empirical methods consist of a series of steps. First, we 
estimate the current risk-adjusted health plan payment model 
in each country, following as closely as possible actual esti-
mation practices, and use this to calculate residual spending 
for each individual in the data. Data from Germany used in 
this paper are from one large insurer.18 For each individual, 
information on diagnoses and expenditures from all hospital 
visits and outpatient treatments are available. Expenditure 
data are available for filled prescriptions at the person level. 
Data from The Netherlands are those actually used for cali-
bration of the risk adjustment model of 2018 and includes 
individual-level information on medical spending and risk 
characteristics for the entire population under the Dutch 
basic health insurance of 2015 (N = 17 m). This informa-
tion comes from various administrative sources, including 
insurers, the tax collector and the registration service for 
social benefits. The U.S. data are a more recent version of 
the MarketScan data used to calibrate plan payment models 
in the Marketplaces. Our 6.8 million sample from MarketS-
can uses the same exclusion/inclusion criteria as used by 
HHS in estimating risk adjustment models, as has been done 
in previous research on Marketplace payment models.19 We 
estimate a model for adults only, with total spending the 
dependent variable. Months of enrollment is not included 
since, contrary to the Dutch and German data, we restrict our 
sample to those enrolled for the full year. Table 2 summa-
rizes some information about the data in all three countries. 
Many more people have some morbidity indicator in Ger-
many, 51.6%, as compared to the other two countries. In the 
U.S. Marketplaces, the 22.3% figure means that almost 80% 
of the population has no diagnosis used for payment during 
a year. These no-indicator people are paid on the basis of age 
and gender alone. In all countries, the distribution of spend-
ing is highly skewed, with a maximum observed spending 
in 1 year at € 2.8 m and € 1.8 m in Germany and The Neth-
erlands, respectively, and $8.5 m in the U.S. Marketplaces. 
We regard it as particularly notable that some of our find-
ings presented in the Results section are common across the 
countries in spite of the differences in payment models used 
(described in Table 1) and the underlying population and 
spending characteristics (described in Table 2).
In a second step, we conduct parallel descriptive anal-
yses to characterize people in the very top/bottom of the 
13 Some of these 128 HCCs are further grouped in the regression 
model. They are also used to form interaction terms. Eight HCCs 
are categorized as “severe illnesses” and if a patient has any of these 
eight severe illnesses, they receive a SEVERE flag. This SEVERE 
variable interacts with 16 other HCCs or groups of HCCs to create 
16 interactions, nine of which belong to the high-cost category and 
the other seven to the medium-cost category. The patient gets an addi-
tional flag added to their risk score for having any of the high-cost 
interactions or medium-cost interactions. If they have both then only 
the high-cost flag is added. In total, there are 94 morbidity-related 
variables used in V0519. Both V0518 and V0519 make extensive 
use of interactions among the HCC variables. For an overview of 
the HCC variables and interaction terms, see https ://www.cms.gov/
CCIIO /Resou rces/Regul ation s-and-Guida nce/Downl oads/2019-Updtd 
-Final -HHS-RA-Model -Coeffi cien ts.pdf.
14 When an NDC from a pharmacy claim is not available, HCPCS 
codes (Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System) from inpa-
tient, outpatient, and professional medical claims with discharge dates 
or through dates within the benefit year can be used to create drug 
indicators. All our observations include drug coverage so we use only 
NDC codes to create drug variables.
15 https ://www.cms.gov/CCIIO /Resou rces/Forms -Repor ts-and-Other 
-Resou rces/Downl oads/RA-March -31-White -Paper -03241 6.pdf. See 
pages 35–39.
16 As of August, 2018, seven states in the U.S. have received waiv-
ers from the federal government to reintroduce additional reinsurance 
features in their Marketplaces. https ://www.commo nweal thfun d.org/
blog/2018/affor dable -care-act-under -trump -admin istra tion?omnic 
id=EALER T1465 357&mid.
17 Software to implement V05-2019 was recently released and can 
be found at https ://www.cms.gov/CCIIO /Resou rces/Regul ation s-and-
Guida nce/index .html. HHS estimates risk adjustment weights without 
regard to the fact that reinsurance affects plan obligations, implying 
that the regression weights are not optimal for predicting plan spend-
ing obligations net of reinsurance payments. The present reinsurance 
is set at such a high threshold that any difference in estimated weights 
would be trivial. In “Targeted reinsurance for dealing with predict-
ably high and low residual spending” where we make more use of the 
reinsurance function, we optimize regression weights for the presence 
of reinsurance.
18 More description of the data source is contained in Schillo et  al. 
[19].
19 See Layton et  al. [12], and Layton and McGuire [13]. Following 
practice for estimating risk adjustment models in the Marketplaces, 
our sample is restricted to those individuals who had both prescrip-
tion drug and mental health coverage and who had no negative or 
capitated claims.
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residual-spending distribution for all three countries. More 
specifically, we identify and analyze the following groups: 
bottom-0.1%, bottom-1%, top-1%, and top-0.1%. Our anal-
yses focus on patterns in healthcare spending and disease 
indicators. These descriptive analyses provide a first taste of 
the extent to which extremely low/high residual spenders dif-
fer from the rest of the population. Moreover, these analyses 
check to what extent patterns of spending and disease flags 
in these groups are similar across countries.
In a third step, we track residual spending year-to-year in 
each country to examine the extent to which ‘being a low/high 
residual spender’ is predictable and/or persistent, features that 
contribute to selection incentives. For both top and bottom 
groups, we calculate (1) the probability of an individual to 
reoccur in the same group next year and (2) the correlation 
between residual spending this year and the next. In addition, 
we calculate mean residual spending (i.e., under/overcompen-
sation) this year for deciles of residual spending last year.
Given the finding that membership to the top and bottom 
groups is highly persistent, we explore how a targeted form of 
reinsurance can help to mitigate selection incentives regard-
ing these groups (step four). Whereas traditional reinsurance 
compensates insurers for a share of individual-level spending 
above a certain threshold of spending, our form of reinsur-
ance targets payments to those with high residual spending 
rather than high spending per se. Residual-based reinsurance 
has been proposed and applied by Schillo et al. [19]. In this 
paper, having identified those with predictable high residual 
spending as the main source of concern, we take targeting 
reinsurance one step further, directing reinsurance to those 
with high probability of high residual spending, i.e., those 
who had very high residual spending in the previous year. 
Residual-based reinsurance with eligibility based on very 
high residual spending from the previous year renders this 
new policy a combination of “high risk-pooling” as proposed 
by Van Barneveld et al. [20] and “residual-based reinsur-
ance” as first proposed by Schillo et al. [19]. We simulate 
the effects of this new policy on selection incentives using 
the following metrics: group-level under/overcompensation, 
“Payment System Fit” (PSF) and “Cumming’s Prediction 
Measure” (CPM). PSF is an R2-type statistic (analogous to a 
pseudo-R2) that recognizes that the payment a plan receives 
for an individual, R
i
 , can include other components in addi-
tion to the predicted spending from a risk adjustment model. 
It quantifies the proportion of squared residual spending from 
a payment system relative to that of a system that provides 
insurers with a flat payment per enrollee equal to the mean 
per person spending in the population. In the case where pay-
ments do not include components outside the regular regres-
sion, PSF equals R2.20 Due to its squaring property, PSF (like 
the R2) is sensitive to outliers. CPM does the same but then 
for absolute residual spending and is thus less sensitive to 
outliers. Our linear CPM also incorporates payments via risk 
sharing as well as predictions from the regression model.
Table 2  Data from three countries
U.S. data only cover people with full-year enrollment. Data from Germany and The Netherlands also cover people who were enrolled only part 
of the year; percentiles of spending presented here are based on actual spending (rather than annualized spending). The positive spending at the 
1st percentile in The Netherlands is a mandatory fee everyone pays to register with a practitioner. People with partial-year enrollment pay this 
mandatory fee in proportion to the fraction of the year they were enrolled. For Germany, the insurer supplying the data requested we not do 
report the proportion of female in the population
Germany The Netherlands (somatic care only) U.S. Marketplaces
Source Sample of a nationwide 
operating sickness fund
Insurers and government agencies Large employers/insurers
Number of individuals 2.4 million 17.0 million 6.8 million
Year 2016 2015 2017
Age range Entire population Entire population 21–64
Average age 49.4 41.3 44.9
Female proportion N/A 50.6% 52.2%
Proportion with any HCC/morbidity flag 51.6% 27.0% 22.3%
Average number of HCCs/morbidity flags 1.5 0.5 0.3
Spending distribution
 1st percentile spending € 0 € 3 $0
 10th percentile spending € 115 € 90 $0
 90th percentile spending € 7900 € 4602 $14,085
 99th percentile spending € 38,560 € 32,241 $80,974
Maximum Spending € 2,859,088 € 1,834,548 $8,541,629
20 In that case we will use R2 throughout this paper.
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Like any form of risk sharing, our targeted form of rein-
surance is expected to reduce incentives for cost control 
since it links (residual) spending and health plan payments: 
for those in the targeted group whose residual spending 
exceeds a threshold, health plan payments go up with (resid-
ual) spending. Incentives for cost control with the non-linear 
risk sharing features of both conventional and residual-based 
reinsurance are not readily described with a single number. 
We track funds required and people touched in our simu-
lation results to shed light on how our risk sharing policy 
affects cost-control incentives. To avoid overfitting issues 
regarding our measures of payment fit and incentives for 
cost control, we follow a split-sample approach. For each 
country, we use one half of the sample, chosen at random, to 
estimate the risk adjustment and reinsurance parameters and 
the other half to calculate our outcome measures.
Results
This section presents the results of our analyses and is 
structured as follows. We first display the findings from our 
descriptive analysis regarding spending patterns and disease 
indicators in the top and bottom groups (“Characterizing 
extremely low/high residual spenders”). After that, we con-
tinue with our findings regarding the persistence of residual 
spending (“Persistence”) and the effects of our new targeted 
form of reinsurance (“Targeted reinsurance for dealing with 
predictably high and low residual spending”).
Characterizing extremely low/high residual 
spenders
Risk adjustment and residual spending
Table 3 presents summary statistics from the regressions 
as well as the distribution of residual spending—spending 
less predicted value—computed after the risk adjustment 
estimation. Our R2 estimates for Germany, 23.1%, The Neth-
erlands, 32.1% and the U.S. Marketplaces, 36.8%, are simi-
lar to those in other reports from each country, 24.6% for 
Germany [4], 32.1% for the Netherlands [21], and 41% for 
the U.S. Marketplaces.21 A higher R2 for the Marketplace 
model compared to that for Germany or The Netherlands is 
expected because Marketplaces use a concurrent risk adjust-
ment model rather than the prospective models used in the 
other two countries.
In all three countries, risk adjustment leaves some indi-
viduals highly underpaid and others highly overpaid. Table 3 
also shows the spending values associated with selected 
percentiles of the residual spending distribution. Negative 
residual spending (spending less revenues) corresponds 
to overpayment, with the greatest negative values of − € 
364 k Euros in Germany, − € 467 k in The Netherlands, and 
− $546 k in the U.S. The minimum and maximum values of 
a distribution are determined by a single observation, so it 
is more telling to compare the values at the top and bottom 
1% and 0.1% of the distributions. On both sides of the dis-
tribution of residual spending, the U.S. is characterized by 
Table 3  Regression results from 
three countries
Germany The Netherlands (somatic 
care only)
U.S. Marketplaces
R2 0.231 0.321 0.368
CPM 0.244 0.319 0.312
Distribution of residuals (€) (€) ($)
Minimum − 364,094 − 466,752 − 545,865
Percentile 0.1 − 27,842 − 24,539 − 95,335
Percentile 1.0 − 11,442 − 8881 − 29,848
Percentile 50 − 802 − 436 − 1582
Percentile 70 − 147 − 254 − 504
Percentile 80 129 377 1121
Percentile 99 27,009 20,282 50,652
Percentile 99.9 87,494 70,636 189,918
Maximum 2,512,588 1,815,707 11,260,784
21 CMS reports the R2 of V0519 estimated on MarketScan data for 
2014 and 2015 to be 41%. https ://www.cms.gov/CCIIO /Resou rces/
Regul ation s-and-Guida nce/Downl oads/2019-Updtd -Final -HHS-RA-
Model -Coeffi cien ts.pdf. In spite of some differences in implemen-
tation of V0519, the correlation between our predictions and those 
using CMS coefficients is a reassuring 0.96.
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higher absolute values, while the German and Dutch results 
are broadly similar. The 0.1% of the distribution occurs at 
− € 28 k and − € 25 k for Germany and The Netherlands, 
respectively, and the much larger − $95 k for the U.S. Mar-
ketplaces. The results imply, for example, that 0.1% of the 
Dutch population are overpaid by more than € 25 k.
On the other side of the residual distribution, there is 
again a rough equivalence between the German and Dutch 
results with the U.S. Marketplaces being more extreme. Spe-
cifically, the German and Dutch 99.9% values are € 87 k and 
€ 71 k, respectively, whereas the U.S. is $190 k. The top 
and bottom 1% can also be seen in Table 3. One percent of 
the population in the U.S. Marketplaces are underpaid by 
the concurrent system by $51 k or more. Spending remains 
less than revenues until around the 80th percentile of the 
distribution in all countries, another indication of the skew-
ness in the distribution of residual spending. Risk adjustment 
reduces, but does not eliminate, the skewness in health care 
spending.
Health conditions in the extremes of the residual spending 
distribution
For each country, Table 4 shows the five most prevalent dis-
ease indicators among the one in a thousand most undercom-
pensated people. In Germany (Panel A), the flag for diabetes 
appears in 14.4% of these extremely high residual spenders. 
The table also shows the frequency of the indicator in the 
entire population and the rank and prevalence among those 
who are the most overcompensated. In Germany, the disease 
with the highest prevalence among the most undercompen-
sated (hypertension) is ranked second among the most over-
compensated. For all five disease indicators, the prevalence 
in both tails of the residual distribution is vastly greater than 
the prevalence in the entire population.
The last column of Table 4 reports the “share of unex-
plained variance” associated with people with this disease 
indicator. In Germany, those with the indicator for poly-
neuropathy (3.1% of the population) account for 10.5% of 
the unexplained variance associated with the risk adjust-
ment model. In other words, this relatively small portion of 
the population, even in the presence of a disease indicator 
for this condition, is responsible for a relatively large share 
of the unexplained variance after risk adjustment. To scale 
this variance differently, if this portion of the variance was 
explained instead of unexplained, it would increase the R2 of 
the risk equalization model to 31.2%.22 Each of the top five 
illnesses among the most undercompensated is associated 
Table 4  Disease indicators among the most (0.1%) undercompensated in three countries
Indicator 0.1% under-compensated 0.1% over-compensated Total population
Rank Prev. (%) Rank Prev. (%) Rank Prev. (%) Share of unex-
plained variance 
(%)
Panel A: Germany (top 5 out of 192 disease indicators)
 HMG091 (hypertension) 1 19.4 2 20.4 1 15.7 17.5
 HMG019 (diabetes) 2 14.4 5 16.5 2 7.1 12.7
 HMG071 (polyneuropathy) 3 12.1 4 16.9 9 3.1 10.5
 HMG080 (heart failure) 4 11.8 3 17.1 6 4.0 12.1
 HMG058 (severe depression) 5 10.6 8 13.5 3 6.5 9.6
Panel B: The Netherlands (top 5 out of 76 disease indicators)
 PCG7 (high cholesterol) 1 11.6 13 9.9 1 6.1 11.5
 PCG14 (hearth disease) 2 10.8 2 22.9 8 2.1 11.6
 sDCG1 (cluster of about 30 diseases) 3 9.6 21 6.7 2 3.1 9.3
 sDCG3 (cluster of about 20 diseases) 4 8.4 4 18.4 24 0.6 7.6
 DCG7 (cluster of about 20 diseases) 5 7.8 5 17.6 28 0.5 6.9
Panel C: U.S. Marketplaces (top 5 out of 94 disease indicators)
 G01 (diabetes) 1 22.2 1 33.7 1 7.5 22.8
 HCC008 (metastatic cancer) 2 15.3 5 23.4 22 0.2 10.7
 HCC130 (congestive heart failure) 3 13.8 6 21.3 8 0.8 13.0
 G15 (COPD) 4 12.9 7 17.0 2 4.7 11.9
 G13 (respiratory arrest) 5 12.8 4 25.4 21 0.3 13.7
22 Given the current R2 of 0.231 (see Table 3), a reduction of 10.5% 
in the unexplained variance would imply an increase in R2 to 0.231 + 
0.105 × (1 − 0.231) = 0.312.
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with a large share of the unexplained variance, a result com-
mon across our three countries.23
In The Netherlands, the most common disease indica-
tor among the top 0.1% of residual spenders is the PCG 
for ‘high cholesterol’. For this indicator, and even more 
so for the other Dutch indicators in Table 4, the preva-
lence among the most undercompensated is (much) higher 
than that in the total population. Apparently, despite their 
above-average predicted spending, people flagged by 
these indicators have a relatively high probability of being 
extremely underpaid. Three of the most prevalent indica-
tors among the highest residual spenders are also present 
in the top-5 indicators among the lowest residual spenders. 
This is remarkable since payment weights (not shown here) 
for these indicators are not among the highest in the risk 
adjustment model. It must be true that some people in these 
groups are also flagged by other disease indicators (with 
high payment weights). In line with their high prevalence 
at both ends of the residual spending distribution, all five 
indicators presented here make a substantial contribution 
to the variance in spending not explained by the Dutch risk 
adjustment model.
The most common disease indicator among the top 
residual spenders in the U.S. is the group code for diabetes, 
seen among 22.2% of the very most undercompensated. 
Diabetes is also the most prevalent code among the most 
overcompensated; indeed, one in three of the bottom resid-
ual spenders has this flag. The commonality of illnesses 
on both tails of the residual distribution is indicated by the 
rankings (1, 5, 6, 7, 4) of the most prevalent among the 
most undercompensated appearing in the most overcom-
pensated. Again, as in Germany and The Netherlands, those 
with these illnesses are responsible for large shares of the 
unexplained variances.
For most disease indicators in Table 4, the prevalence 
among the most overcompensated is greater than that among 
the most undercompensated. An explanation for this is that 
to be extremely overcompensated, people need to be flagged 
by one or more (very expensive) disease indicators, which is 
not true for the other side of the residual spending distribu-
tion. As a result, disease flags are expected to be more pre-
sent among people with low residual spending than among 
those with high residual spending.
Share of spending on drugs
In addition to the patterns in disease flags among low and 
high residual spenders, we are also interested in how types 
of spending vary across the distribution of residual spend-
ing and across countries. Because of differences in the way 
utilization is classified in the datasets available for this study 
(for example, whether hospital outpatient claims are clas-
sified as “hospital” as in The Netherlands or “Outpatient” 
as in the U.S.), we focus here on the share of spending on 
drugs outside the hospital reported similarly in all countries. 
Figure 1 shows the share of spending on drugs in all spend-
ing by position in the residual spending distribution (the 
bottom and top 0.1% groups are included in the bottom and 
top 1% groups). Here the patterns differ somewhat across 
the countries. Germany has the highest share of spending 
on drugs with the bottom 1% group spending nearly 40% on 
drugs. The bottom 0.1% group has an even higher share of 
spending on drugs: it reaches 64%. The Netherlands shows 
the lowest share of spending on drugs. The top 1% group 
Fig. 1  Share of spending on 















































































23 Membership in the groups is not mutually exclusive, so the per-
centages of unexplained variance cannot simply be “added up”.
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only spends 6% on drugs—the top 0.1% group spends about 
the same. For the U.S. Marketplaces, the bottom 0.1% and 
the top 0.1% group each spend about 14% on drugs. The 
bottom and top 1% groups are similar as well, spending 21% 
and 16%, respectively, on drugs. In the U.S., it is the mid-
dle group that has the highest share of spending on drugs 
at 28%.
Figure 1 may convey the appearance that spending on 
drugs in the U.S. is less than in Germany, but the opposite 
is true. The middle group is by far the biggest in each coun-
try, and the figure reports percentages rather than absolute 
amounts. The average spending on drugs outside the hospital 
in the U.S. across the entire population is $1717, whereas 
it is €770 in Germany. The Dutch spend the least overall, at 
€271 per capita. In the U.S. and Germany, drug spending is 
based on prices paid at retail outlets, and does not take into 
account manufacturer rebates, which will be important for 
branded drugs, particularly in the U.S. In the Netherlands 
drug spending is corrected for rebates.
Unexplained variance
Figure 2 shows where the variation in residual spending falls 
along the distribution of residual spending. The results are 
remarkably similar across countries.24 Consider first Ger-
many, and start with the top 0.1% of residual spenders, the 
very most underpaid group. While the share of spending for 
this group is about 5%, the share of unexplained variance 
in spending is 47.5%. In other words, almost half of the 
residual sum of squares after risk adjustment for the entire 
population rests with this one-in-one-thousand group.25 
Considering the top 1.0% (in which the top 0.1% is included) 
brings us to 18.5% of total spending and 72.3% of variance 
unexplained by the risk adjustment model. The issue of “fit” 
of Germany’s risk adjustment model as measured by unex-
plained variance is seen to be largely an issue of fit in the 
extreme upper tail of the residual spending distribution. The 
situations in The Netherlands and the U.S. Marketplaces are 
very much the same. The top 0.1% of the residual spend-
ing distribution accounts for about half of the unexplained 
variance, whereas the top 1.0% accounts for three quarters.
Persistence
If being grossly under- or overpaid occurred at random, 
under- and overpayment would affect financial uncertainty 
for health insurers but would not create selection-related 
incentives, since a plan would have no action that it might 
take that would be correlated with high profits or losses. 
From the standpoint of selection incentives, the degree of 
persistence in membership in the tails of the residual spend-
ing distribution is important to quantify. If people tend to 
stay in these very unprofitable or very profitable groups, 
plans will have a powerful incentive to deter the former and 
attract the latter.
Table 5 measures persistence in two ways. Again, start 
with Germany and the top 0.1% group in terms of residual 
spending. If membership in this group were random, only 
0.1% of people in this group would reappear in the top 0.1% 
of residual spending next year. Instead, 20.7% remain in the 
Fig. 2  Share of unexplained 
variance per percentile of 
residual spending
24 In results not shown, the share of spending across the range of 
residual spending is also similar in the three countries. The share of 
spending accounted for by the top 0.1% and 1.0% of the residual dis-
tribution ranges from 5 to 7% and 19 to 24%, respectively, in the three 
countries.
25 R2 is the share of total variance explained by the risk adjustment 
model, and is normally taken as a useful statistic indicating good per-
formance of a risk adjustment system. The share of unexplained vari-
ance for a risk adjustment model can also be readily calculated. From 
Table 3 we know that the risk adjustment model for Germany has an 
R2 of 23.1%, leaving 76.9% “unexplained.” The top 0.1% accounts for 
47.5% of the unexplained variance, or 35.9% of the total variance in 
spending. For an earlier paper that recognized the massive share of 
the unexplained variance in the Marketplaces, see Farid and McGuire 
[6]. Similar findings for Switzerland have also been reported. See 
Kauer et al. [11].
Footnote 25 (continued)
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same top 0.1% group year-on-year, a likelihood 207 times 
greater than would be expected by pure chance. Results for 
this group for the U.S. are much the same, a simple per-
sistence of 27.2% year-on-year retained membership. The 
Dutch are different, with “only” 10.6% remaining year-to-
year, which is likely due to the Dutch risk adjustors defined 
on the basis of “spending persistence”. Still, more than 10% 
of the 0.1% top Dutch residual spenders returning to the 
group for a second year imply very significant persistence 
in residual spending. Persistence in group membership on 
both sides of the residual spending distribution is evident 
for all three countries. We include the large middle group 
for reference, but it is not surprising that most people in the 
wide band of what we call “middle” remain in that band 
year-to-year.
We also measure persistence by simple correlation of 
costs from one year to the next, with the groups set by mem-
bership in a top or bottom tail group in the initial year. If 
there was complete regression to the mean, the year-to-year 
correlation would be zero, but in fact we see reasonably high 
correlations of around 0.3 for both Germany and The Neth-
erlands. The U.S. Marketplaces exhibit a slightly different 
pattern with a lower correlation for the groups most over-
paid and a higher correlation of around 0.6 for the groups 
underpaid.
Figure 3 presents persistence from another angle: mean 
residual spending this year for groups defined by residual 
spending in the prior year. At the far left are those in the 
lowest percentile of residual spending in the prior year, i.e., 
the most overpaid. The next group consists of those in the 
second-lowest percentile, and so on. The figure presents 
five groups corresponding to the bottom percentiles (left) 
and five groups corresponding to the top percentiles (right). 
The middle group (i.e., 6–95) contains all people who were 
between the 6th and 95th percentile of the residual spend-
ing distribution in the prior year. The data series show that 
the extremely low residual spenders in the prior year are 
on average profitable to insurers in the current year. The 
opposite holds for extremely high residual spenders in the 
prior year; these people tend to be (very) unprofitable in 
the current year. The variation in profitability among the 
presented groups is highest for the U.S. and lowest for The 
Netherlands.
Table 5  Measures of Persistence in Residual Spending in Three 
Countries
Germany The Netherlands 
(somatic care only)
U.S. Marketplaces
Share of people reoccuring in same group next year
 Bottom 0.1% 27.1% 10.6% 30.3%
 Bottom 1.0% 30.5% 17.7% 35.3%
 Middle 98.8% 97.2% 98.6%
 Top 1.0% 17.5% 13.0% 23.9%
 Top 0.1% 20.7% 10.6% 27.2%
Correlation between residual spending in this year and the next
 Bottom 0.1% 0.30 0.32 0.14
 Bottom 1.0% 0.33 0.19 0.17
 Middle 0.14 0.05 0.21
 Top 1.0% 0.21 0.29 0.54
 Top 0.1% 0.26 0.33 0.58
Fig. 3  Mean residual spending 
for groups defined by residual 
spending in year t − 1: three 
countries
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Targeted reinsurance for dealing with predictably 
high and low residual spending
The motivation and working of our targeted reinsurance 
policy can be explained by reference to Fig. 3. In all three 
countries (the absolute value of) mean residual spending 
in the current year is largest for the group on the far right, 
i.e., those who were in the top-1% of the residual spending 
distribution in the prior year. This is the group we target with 
residual-based reinsurance. Specifically, our proposed form 
of risk sharing pays reinsurance based on residual spending 
in this group with a sufficiently low threshold to cap the 
mean residual spending for our targeted group to the average 
level in the neighboring group, i.e., those between the 98th 
and 99th percentiles of the residual-spending distribution 
in the prior year.
To improve the overall fit of payments to spending, we 
optimize risk adjustment weights for the presence of risk 
sharing and vice versa. In other words, our payment weights 
are chosen to best fit payments to spending given the pres-
ence of our targeted reinsurance, and our residual-based 
reinsurance uses residuals from the optimized weights. An 
iterative procedure is needed because a change in risk adjust-
ment payments affects the mean underpayment in both our 
group of interest (i.e., the one to the very right of Fig. 3) 
and the neighboring group, calling for a modification of 
the reinsurance threshold to level the mean underpayment 
for these two groups. For all three countries, ten iterations 
are sufficient to converge on a joint solution for the optimal 
weights and residual spending threshold.
The three panels in Fig. 4 show the effects of our targeted 
reinsurance system on the outcomes for the groups defined 
by residual spending in the prior year. These groups mimic 
those presented in Fig. 3 for each country. In each panel, the 
solid line corresponds to the relevant country line in Fig. 3. 
Note, however, that the scale of the vertical axis is now dif-
ferent for the three countries. As intended, the reinsurance 
system caps the mean undercompensation of people in the 
highest percentile of residual spending in the prior year to 
that of those in the second-highest percentile.26 Perhaps sur-
prisingly, reinsurance targeted at the extreme right of the 
residual spending distribution substantially reduces overpay-
ments at the extreme left of the distribution. The explana-
tion, previewed in Table 4 above, is that the disease indi-
cators most prevalent among the most undercompensated 
tend also to be prevalent among the most overcompensated. 
Intuitively, risk sharing directed to the undercompensated 
reduces the burden on the diseases of the undercompen-
sated to fit the higher health care costs, resulting in lower 
estimated payment weights for these diseases. It was the 
high payment weights on these diseases that created the 
extremely overcompensated. Reducing the payment weights, 
thus, improves the situation on the left extreme as well as 
the right extreme side of the residual spending distribution. 
Additional payments to those most undercompensated must 
come from somewhere, and, in effect, optimizing the risk 
adjustment weights means that financing of payments for the 
Fig. 4  Mean residual spending for groups defined by residual spend-
ing in year t − 1: three countries/two models
26 A closer look at Fig. 4 reveals that the mean undercompensation of 
people in the highest percentile of residual spending is slightly lower 
than that of those in the second-highest percentile. The explanation 
for this is that our risk adjustment and reinsurance parameters are 
based on the training sample (in which the mean undercompensation 
in the two groups after reinsurance is exactly the same), while the 
results in Fig. 4 are based on our test sample (where the undercom-
pensation in the two groups is subject to random variation). It appears 
that some regression to the mean in spending is somewhat higher 
in the very tail of the distribution, accounting for the slightly lower 
undercompensation in all three countries for this group.
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undercompensated comes from just where you would want 
it to come from—the overcompensated.
In sum, the payment system simulations show that our 
targeted form of reinsurance mitigates both predictably low 
and predictably high residual spending. In addition to the 
group-level outcomes presented in Fig. 4, we also calculated 
two measures of individual-level fit, i.e., PSF and CPM. The 
outcomes are presented in Table 6 and show that targeted 
reinsurance comes with a (substantial) increase in individ-
ual-level payment fit. In all three countries, the increase in 
PSF is larger than that in CPM, the explanation being that 
our targeted form of reinsurance inherently allocates pay-
ments to those people for whom payment gaps from risk 
adjustment are largest.27 In the U.S. the increase in individ-
ual-level fit is larger than in Germany and The Netherlands, 
which can be explained by the fact that the distribution of 
residuals in the U.S. is even more skewed than in the other 
two countries. The share of unexplained variance (Fig. 2) 
for the top-0.1% in the U.S. is 57%; whereas in Germany 
and The Netherlands, it is 48%, respectively, 46%. This also 
means that the reinsurance funds (needed to cap the mean 
underpayment in our group of interest) is somewhat larger 
in the U.S. Marketplaces than in the other two countries (as 
we will see next).
To shed light on how our reinsurance policy affects 
incentives for cost control, Table 6 also presents the share 
of funds required for our reinsurance policy and the share 
of people touched by this policy. For the Netherlands, we 
find that insurers receive a reinsurance payment for 0.1% of 
the population (one in a thousand); the share of reinsurance 
payments in total spending equals 1.9%. For Germany, these 
figures equal 0.3% and 3.6% and for the U.S. Marketplaces 
they are 0.3% and 4.3%. In all three countries, the share 
of payments necessary to fund our targeted reinsurance is 
small. The number of people affected is very small, ranging 
from 0.1 to 0.3% of the population.
Discussion
The three countries studied here all rely on managed com-
petition for all or part of their social health insurance sys-
tem, and all use a sophisticated disease-based risk adjust-
ment algorithm to pay insurers. Indeed, the risk adjustment 
schemes in these three countries are arguably the most com-
plex and sophisticated algorithms in use anywhere. None-
theless, the payment formulas differ in important ways. The 
Marketplace formula is concurrent rather than prospective as 
in Germany and The Netherlands. The number and form of 
morbidity-based indicators varies considerably. The health 
care systems differ too, in the populations included, depth of 
coverage, forms and extent of managed care, costs of vari-
ous inputs, patterns of health care, and so on. For example, 
the share of spending on drugs is much greater in the U.S. 
than in The Netherlands. In spite of these many profound 
differences, and remarkably in our view, our three-country 
comparisons identify several important findings that hold 
in all settings.
In all three countries, risk adjustment leaves some indi-
viduals highly underpaid and others highly overpaid. In 
Germany and The Netherlands, one in a thousand people 
are underpaid by more than € 87 k and € 71 k, respectively. 
Table 6  Outcomes for two 
Alternative Payment Systems
Germany The Netherlands 
(somatic care only)
U.S. Marketplaces
Risk Adjustment (RA) only
 Mean residual year t for:
  Top-1% residual spenders in t − 1 €16,960 €5,764 $37,761
  Bottom-1% residual spenders in t − 1 − €6606 − €2172 − $21,656
 PSF 0.232 0.319 0.379
 CPM 0.246 0.318 0.312
RA + targetted reinsurance
 Mean residual year t for:
  Top-1% residual spenders in t − 1 €5664 €1923 $12,284
  Bottom-1% residual spenders in t − 1 − €4084 − €1197 − $15,521
 PSF 0.479 0.436 0.626
 CPM 0.291 0.338 0.360
 Reinsurance threshold €21,062 €27,063 $40,538
 Share of spending affected by reinsurance 0.036 0.019 0.043
 Share of population affected 0.003 0.001 0.003
27 Due to its squaring property, PSF is more sensitive to (reductions 
in) large payment gaps than CPM.
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With a residual of > $190 k for this top-0.1% group, under-
payments in the U.S. Marketplaces are even more extreme. 
On the other side of the residual distribution, we find that 
one in a thousand people are overpaid by at least € 28 k 
(Germany), € 25 k (The Netherlands) and $95 k (U.S. Mar-
ketplaces). In all three countries, the top- and bottom-1% 
groups share some of the same diseases. With risk adjustor 
weights estimated with least squares, as is done in all three 
countries, the sum of residuals conditional on a disease indi-
cator is zero. People with a disease indicator who tend to be 
very underpaid, thus, must be balanced with people with 
the same disease indicator who are overpaid. Although it is 
not necessarily true that the balancing overpayment comes 
from people with extreme overpayment (i.e., instead it could 
come from many people with less-extreme overpayment), 
diseases disproportionally found among the most undercom-
pensated tend to be also disproportionally found among the 
most overcompensated.
Another finding common in all three countries is that the 
one in a thousand highest residual spenders are responsible 
for a large share of the variance in residual spending, from 
46.1% in The Netherlands to 47.5% in Germany and 56.6% 
in the U.S. Marketplaces. In other words, almost half of the 
residual sum of squares after risk adjustment for the entire 
population rests with the top 0.1% of most underpaid peo-
ple. If this portion of the variance was explained instead 
of unexplained, it would increase the R2 of the risk adjust-
ment models to more than 60%. This finding is behind the 
huge impact of reinsurance policies on squared measures of 
individual-level payment fit.
When it comes to the effects of extreme residual spend-
ing on the functioning of health plan markets, our most rel-
evant finding is that being grossly under- or overpaid does 
not occur at random. For all three countries, we find that 
extreme under- and overpayments are persistent. For people 
in the top 1% of losses this year, insurers can expect a mean 
underpayment next year of €16,960 (Germany), €5764 (The 
Netherlands) and $37,761 (U.S. Marketplaces). For the one 
in a hundred most overpaid people this year, insurers can 
expect a mean overpayment next year of €6606 (Germany), 
€2172 (The Netherlands) and $21,656 (U.S. Marketplaces). 
These findings indicate that extreme under/overpayment is 
to some extent predictable and can contribute to selection 
problems.
The high degree of persistence in membership in the 
extremes of the residual spending distribution in all three 
countries raises concerns that insurers might take steps to 
deter those who tend to be underpaid and attract those who 
tend to be overpaid. Attracting the healthy/deterring the sick 
among subsets of the populations with the disease indica-
tors (such as diabetes) prevalent on both extremes of the 
residual spending distribution could be a highly profitable 
strategy, and potentially lead to distortions in the efficient 
care for these groups. In response to these findings, we pro-
posed a form of reinsurance, based on residuals, and tar-
geted to members of a “risk pool” defined on past-year very 
high undercompensation. Careful targeting (along with re-
estimating the beta weights in risk adjustment to take into 
account the reinsurance payments) leads to very substantial 
improvements in overall fit of payments to spending, with 
especially large effects for the most extremely under- and 
overcompensated. The share of people affected by this 
form of risk sharing is very small, less than 3 in 1000 in all 
three countries. While our proposed policy seems effective 
in better tying payments to spending, there are alternative 
approaches to the same issue. One example would be to find 
ways to split groups like those with diabetes and other ill-
nesses prevalent among the undercompensated into those 
likely to be on one or the other side of the residual spend-
ing distribution. Calling attention to the powerful effects 
members of the tails of the residual distribution have on the 
overall fit of the models is the first step in directing policy 
attention to these important groups.
Cross-country data analyses are a powerful way to com-
pare effects of health plan payment systems on incentives 
for insurers, and, in particular, to seek results that are likely 
to be generalizable to other data and policy settings. Our 
study shows, however, that this type of research comes with 
challenges related to the underlying differences in the health 
care systems. Differences go deeper than simple differences 
in risk equalization models, down to coding conventions and 
treatment practices. In some ways, analyses for Germany and 
The Netherlands are more comparable to one another than 
they are to the U.S. Marketplaces. The healthcare systems 
themselves are quite similar in the two European countries. 
The payment system in the Marketplaces is concurrent rather 
than prospective. And unlike in Germany and The Nether-
lands where data from actual experience are used for figur-
ing risk equalization payments, in the U.S., data for calibrat-
ing the risk equalization model are from large employers and 
insurers, not from the Marketplaces themselves. Recogniz-
ing these important differences makes the commonality of 
our findings even more striking.
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